Introduction
In recent years, the ecological environment deterioration caused by global warming and climate change has not only affected the quality of life, but also has a profound impact on the sustainable development of 2 human society and world economy. To solve these environmental problems, the United Nations has held some Climate Change Conferences to discuss countermeasures against these global environmental problems.
Carbon emission permit trading, which is a market mechanism to reduce global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, has been considered an efficient and effective policy instrument in the mitigation of global warming and climate change (Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Li and Jia, 2016; Zhao et al., 2017) .
Due to the rapid expansion of economy over the past decade, China has become the largest energy consumer and GHG emitter in the world (Wei et al., 2014) . With increasing domestic resources and environmental constraints and the need of meeting international commitments for reducing GHG emissions, Chinese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) authorized seven administrative areas to launch pilot carbon emission trading system that started operation between 2013 or 2014. These even provinces and regions, at which are at different levels of industrial structure and economic development, includes Beijing, Chongqing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangdong, and Hubei. More recently, a nationwide carbon emission permit trading schemes has established in the power industry sector by the end of 2017. However, China's nationwide carbon emission permit trading system is still in the experimental stage, and there are many problems existed, such as the defective in pricing mechanisms and low market participation (Peidong et al., 2009; Zhou et al., 2013) . Therefore, understanding the impact of national carbon emission permit trading scheme on economy and social is critical (Lederer, 2012; Cui et al., 2014) .
There are some literatures investigates the impact of national carbon emission permit trading scheme on economy from the perspective of improving the cost-effectiveness in CO 2 abatement. They answered the question that how much abatement costs savings can be identified by trading carbon emission permit. For example, Stavins (1995) first discussed the interaction between tradable emission permit and transaction costs from the theoretical perspective. Newell and Stavins (2003) predicted 51% abatement cost savings from trading nitrogen oxide emission permits with market-based policies in electric utilities industry of United States. Leleu (2012) introduced a hybrid theoretical model to ensure the correct sign of marginal abatement cost and the economic meaning of shadow price. Fä re et al. (2014) employed the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model to calculate the difference of maximal kilowatt-hour between the command-and-control regulation and tradable emission permit regulation. Wang et al. (2016) also used a DEA-based programming model to estimate the recovery of GDP from trading carbon emission permit among provinces in China during 2006-2010. In this study, we try to answer the question of how much the theoretical potential gains (or abatement cost savings) can be obtained from trading carbon emission permits in China's power industry sector among different provinces. We compare the carbon abatement cost from implementing two sequential simulations: no emission permit trading simulation and emission permit tradable simulation. On one hand, we employ a DEA-based by-production approach to estimate the opportunity abatement cost savings (i.e., the difference on maximal gross output value with and without carbon emission permit trading). Furthermore, CO 2 emission transfers among provinces and areas in trading are identified. DEA-based programming model, which can 3 estimate the maximal economic output through a piecewise linear frontier, has been widely used in the research of tradable emission permits allocation that is viewed as the first step of starting the permit trading process (Lozano et al., 2009 ). On the other hand, we apply the parametric directional distance function (DDF) to compute the marginal abatement cost savings or the changes in shadow prices of CO 2 .
This study makes some contributions to the existing literature from both the theoretical and the application perspectives. First, this study takes both the opportunity abatement cost and the marginal abatement cost into consideration, presenting a more comprehensive investigation on the economic benefit from trading carbon emission permit. Second, the opportunity abatement cost savings and the marginal abatement cost savings from carbon emission permit trading are derived from simulative calculations instead of econometric analysis which helps to avoid the impact of other policies and activities on changes of carbon abatement cost. Third, the DEA-based by-production approach provides a more reasonable evaluation for identifying the opportunity abatement cost savings from trading carbon emission permit in China's power industry with a residual generation mechanism setting. Fourth, this is the first study to estimate the abatement cost savings from nationwide carbon emission permit trading in China's power industry sector through an ex post analysis and to propose additional policy options for achieving more economic benefit.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the recent literature on modelling pollution-generating technologies and estimating the abatement cost of CO 2 emissions. Section 3 proposes the model for estimating opportunity abatement cost savings, and Section 4 presents the model for estimating marginal abatement cost savings. Section 5 presents the data. In Section 6, we report the empirical results and provide the discussions. Section 7 concludes this paper.
Literature review

Modelling pollution-generating technologies
Generally, the technologies on generating desirable outputs and pollutions has been formalized in four different ways. First, a kind of approaches consider pollutions as free disposable inputs (Yang and Pollitt, 2009; Mahlnerg et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012) . The main argument behind this kind of approach is that pollutions are unavoidable residuals and the subset of pollution-generating inputs. However, the free disposability assumption on pollutions includes the situation that finite amount inputs can generate infinite amount pollutions, thus violating the physical laws and the law of mass conservation (Fä re and Grosskopf, 2003; . Second, another group of approaches treats pollutions as extra outputs by assuming that pollutions satisfy weak disposability and desirable outputs and undesirable outputs satisfy null-jointness (Fä re and Grosskopf, 2009; Shortall and Barnes, 2013; Song and Wang, 2018; Xian et al., 2018) .
This kind of approach assumes the joint-production of desirable outputs and pollutions. However, as discussed by Coelli et al. (2007) and Wang, Mi and Wei (2018) , the weak disposability and null-jointness assumption would break the first law of thermodynamics. Third, due to the limit of the weak disposability assumption, a 4 kind of approach based on the mass/energy balance equation was introduced (Lauwers et al., 1999; Førsund, 2018) . Although this approach assumes the inevitability of generating pollutions, it ignores the correction between the pollution-generating inputs and non-pollution-generating inputs. Last, a more recent kind of approach divide the production progress into generating desirable outputs and generating pollutants, respectively (Førsund, 2009; Sueyoshi and Goto, 2010; Sueyoshi and Goto, 2013) . The operational efficiency and environmental efficiency would be evaluated in different sub-frontier in this approach named by-production approach. Moreover, this model considers the interaction of pollution-generating inputs and non-pollution-generating inputs relying the cost disposability assumption in the technology with respect to pollutions.
Estimating abatement cost for CO 2
The question of the estimation of the economic cost arising from pollution generation has become an important area of the interest in energy and environment. On the one hand, the opportunity abatement cost of CO 2 represents the economic benefits of the trade-off between generating CO 2 emissions and desirable outputs.
It can be computed through different pollution-generating technologies. On the other hand, the shadow price of CO 2 , which refers to the opportunity cost caused by an additional unit in terms of CO 2 emission reduction, can be viewed as one kind of marginal abatement cost. The shadow price of CO 2 is derived from the available market prices of desirable outputs through duality theory and distance function (or directional distance function), and the distance function (or directional distance function) could be estimated by nonparametric or parametric approaches (Zhou et al., 2014) . The parametric economic models need the specification of production function form, and the nonparametric mathematical programing methods offer larger possibilities because of less restrictive assumption.
The nonparametric methods without a predefining function form (e.g., data envelopment analysis, DEA), have been widely used to estimate the environmental efficiency and the shadow prices of CO 2 . For example, Boyd et al. (1996) utilized DEA technique to estimate the production frontier and the marginal abatement cost of SO 2 for the coal-burning utilities of United States. Lee et al. (2014) integrated the engineering-economic approach and the nonparametric directional distance function to estimate the shadow price of CO 2 in the power plants of Korean. In addition, Lee and Zhou (2015) conducted a directional marginal productivity approach to estimate the directional shadow prices of CO 2 , SO 2 and NOx in the coal power industry of United States.
The parametric methods are more commonly used in application because the production function with a specific form is differentiable everywhere (Du et al., 2015) . Trans-log production function and multi-objective linear programming to evaluate the impact on the CO 2 abatement cost of power generation sector in China.
3 Opportunity abatement cost estimation method
Opportunity abatement cost
To qualify the generation of pollutions in the production process, joint production is commonly used for analysis. However, the joint production, which considers pollution as input with free disposability assumption or as output with weak disposability assumption, may lead to unacceptable implications for the trade-offs between inputs and outputs. In the other words, these treating indicates that there would be a "rich menu" of output vector in the production possibility set, possibly including some zero amounts of outputs given the fixed inputs (Dapko et al., 2016) . To solve this problem, the by-production approach accounts for the materials balance principles implying the inevitability of a certain quantity of incidental output, given the certain amounts of inputs and/or desirable outputs.
In this study, by-production model based on DEA technique is employed to estimate the opportunity abatement cost, as it is appropriate to obtain the abatement cost with multiple inputs and outputs from the perspective of distinguishing the sub-processes of producing desirable outputs and pollutions. By utilizing the provincial data of China's power industry sector for the 2011-2015 period, the maximal potential desirable output (i.e., gross industrial output value) is estimated under conditions without and with carbon emission permit trading, respectively. The distinguish in the maximal potential gross industrial output value between non-tradable and tradable is used to explain opportunity abatement cost savings from trading carbon emission permit.
The by-production model, proposed by Murty et al. (2012) , and generalized by Dakpo (2015) and Dapko et al. (2017) , appears to be a promising approach in the modelling of pollution generation technologies. In this approach, two sub-processes are estimated: a desirable output production technology and a residual pollutions generation technology. Assuming each province employs three inputs (x i , i =1, 2, 3) including the number of employees, net value of fixed assets and energy consumption, to generate one desirable output of gross industrial output value, denoted by y, and one undesirable output of CO 2 emissions, denoted by u, over t=1,…,5 years. The input vector can be divided into two sub-vectors: the non-pollution-causing inputs X 1 (i.e., net value of fixed assets and the number of employees) and the pollution-causing input x 3 (i.e., energy use).
Hence, the total production technology T can be represented by:
where f and g are differentiable and continuously. The overall production possibility set T represents a pollution-generating technology setting a residual generation mechanism with material balance. Set T 1 is a standard production technology set, reflecting the production in which inputs can be transformed into desirable output and undesirable output. In this set, the inputs, desirable output satisfy strongly disposable assumption and undesirable output imposes no constraint. Moreover, set T 2 reflects the nature's residual-generation mechanism. The equality constraint
in T 2 represents the material balance, implying that given the quantity of pollution-causing input, the level of pollution is fixed. In this set, pollution satisfies costly disposable assumption as follows:
The costly disposable assumption indicates the possibility of inefficiency in the production of pollution. In summary, this technology is modeled as an intersection of two processes (i.e., an intended production technology and a nature's residual-generation set). The former satisfies standard disposability properties, while the latter violates strong disposability of pollution and pollution-causing inputs. As a result, the intersection also violates standard free disposability of pollution and pollution causing inputs.
As discussed before, the abatement cost saving is defined as the gap between potential maximal gross industrial output value with carbon emission permit trading and without (Brä nnlund et al., 1998; Fä re et al., 2013) . First, we create a no trading simulation model for all provinces in each t period. For province j 0 at t period, its potential maximal gross industrial output value with no carbon emission permit trading can be estimated as follows: i.e., a proportional change in inputs would not induce a similar proportional change in desirable output and pollution. The last equality connects two sub-progresses of generating desirable output and undesirable output.
Thus, the corresponding maximal gross industrial output value for all provinces at t period and the total maximal gross industrial output value for all provinces over the entire study period can be calculated as follows, respectively:
,.
.
where the superscript NT refers to no carbon emission permit trading.
Similarly, given that the carbon emission permit can be reallocated among different provinces and be allowed for interspatial and intertemporal trading (i.e., the nationwide emission permit trading), the maximal gross industrial output value for all provinces at the whole T periods can be computed as follows: 
Marginal abatement cost estimation method
The estimation of the shadow price of pollutants is carried out following the approach of Fä re et al. 
Then, the directional output distance function reflects the production technology and can defined as follows (Chung et al., 1997) :
where   , g  yu gg is the output directional vector and is always positive. This DDF simultaneously contracts u and expands y along the g direction until it hits the boundary of P(x). The distance β is the inefficiency score and is nonnegative (   ).
According to Bellenger and Herlihy (2010) , the DDF inherits some properties from the possibility set P(x), these properties include:
Property (i) is the representation property, states that the DDF is nonnegative for all feasible output vectors. Property (ii) refers to translation property, meaning that if undesirable outputs are contracted by u g and desirable outputs are expanded by y g , the value of the resulting DDF will be more efficient by a positive scalar  . Property (iii) is the non-increasing monotonicity property referring to the strong disposability assumption of desirable outputs. In addition, property (iv) is the non-decreasing monotonicity property corresponding to undesirable outputs. Lastly, property (v) represents the weak disposability assumption of desirable and undesirable outputs.
For empirical estimation of DDF, both parametric approach and nonparametric approach can be used. In this study, the parametric linear programming (LP) approach is employed because this approach has the advantages of constraints inclusion and differentiability. In addition, the quadratic functional form of DDF satisfies the translation property and is twice differentiable and flexible (Wei et al., 2013) . Therefore, a quadratic functional form is assumed for the jth unit as follows:
Additionally, we assume that the directional vector means that we hope to an extend on desirable output when undesirable output is unchanged, and g = (1, -1) means that we hope to an extend on desirable output and an reduction on undesirable output simultaneously. The deterministic LP algorithm proposed by Lee and Zhou (2015) and Molinos-Senante (2015) can be used to estimate the parameters of the quadratic DDF represented in Eq. (11), and can be represented as follows: 
To overcome the convergence problem, the normalized values Based on the estimated parameters in model (12), the shadow price of the pollutions can be written as follows:
where p is the price of desirable output and can be obtained in advance. Since the values of inputs and outputs are normalized by dividing their mean values in model (12), the shadow prices should also multiply the mean value of the ratio of y by u.
We compute both the relative shadow prices of pollution using the observed values, the optimal values with and without trading carbon emission permit. If the relative shadow price under the no trading simulation model is lower than the relative shadow price of the observed values, their difference would be defined as the marginal abatement cost savings from eliminating technical inefficiency in this study. Similarly, if the relative shadow price with trading is lower than the relative shadow price without trading, their difference would be defined as the marginal abatement cost savings from trading carbon emission permit.
Results and discussion
Data and descriptive statistics
This study is conducted to analyze the economic benefit (i.e., cost savings) from trading CO 2 emission permit between 30 provinces in China's power industry sector over 2011 -2015 using the models developed in Section 3 and 4. Therefore, the observed CO 2 emissions and economic output (i.e., gross industrial output value at provincial level) are selected as outputs. To generate the economic output, three important inputs (i.e., labor, capital and energy use) are taken into consideration. All the results are calculated in The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) software.
We collect the data for labor (i.e., number of employees), capital (i.e., net value of fixed assets) and 
Potential opportunity abatement cost savings from trading
Model (5) and Model (8) are first employed to maximal gross values with and without implementing emission permit trading system, and thus identifying potential opportunity abatement cost savings. Table 2 reports the potential opportunity abatement cost savings at the national level during 2011-2015.
The column of potential abatement cost savings from eliminating technical inefficiency indicates the difference between the optimal gross output value of no trading simulation model and the observed industrial gross output value, and the column of potential abatement cost savings from introducing trading represents the difference between the optimal gross output value with and without carbon emission permit trading. It can be seen that 2305 billion yuan (42.4%) annual average potential abatement cost would be saved after removing technical inefficiency in China's power generation sector during entire 12 th Five-Year period, whereas more 1024 billion yuan (13.2%) annual average potential abatement cost would be identified after introducing a nationwide carbon emission permit trading system. To be specific, the increased annual percentage of potential cost savings from eliminating technical inefficiency ranges from 36% to 52% during 2011-2015 12 which represents a considerable amount of theoretical loss of gross output value associated with technical inefficiency in power industry sector of China. In other words, the reason of theoretical loss of gross output value here is that not all provinces are operating on the efficient production frontier. During the same period, the potential cost savings from trading, which indicate the differences in maximal gross output value with and without the tradable permit system estimations in China's power generation sector, makes the impact of national carbon emission permit trading system on the industrial gross output value quantified. The increased annual percentage of potential cost savings from trading ranges from 3.8% to 18.2%, which indicate the theoretical magnitude of gross output value loss associated with the temporal regulatory rigidity and the spatial temporal regulatory rigidity of China's power generation sector. Scilicet, the theoretical gross output value losses here are caused by the suboptimal allocation of emission permit among provinces and years. In details, Fig. 1 shows the potential opportunity abatement cost savings form trading for each province during entire 12 th Five-Year period. From Fig. 1 , it can be seen that Xinjiang has the highest total abatement costs savings about 351 billion yuan in economic gross output value loss occurred with trading CO2 emission permit, followed by Henan as the second highest. Mover, Xinjiang not only has the highest abatement costs savings from trading, it also is subject to much higher increased percentage accounting for around 46.7%. On the contrary, Hainan has the smallest abatement costs savings and has nearly 27% of increased percentage after the CO2 emission permits are reallocated. The underlying reason is that Hainan has the relatively small production scale on electricity generation and energy consumption compared with the other regions, and thus limited economic scale might occur with limited amount on economic loss recovery. In addition, it is worth mentioning that Qinghai has the greatest increase percentage associate with trading carbon emission permit.
The possible reason is that although Qinghai has similar production scale with Hainan, more capital capacity would occur with more potentials on recovering industrial gross output value. It shows that the CO 2 emission permit mainly transfer from east area to west area and from north area to south area, indicating that the southwest area of China with low carbon inefficiency and low abatement cost need to buy additional carbon emission permits from the northeast area and northwest area with high carbon inefficiency and high emission abatement cost. It is worth noting that there are two exceptions: Beijing and Jiangsu provinces. These two regions are also efficient units with low carbon inefficiency and low emission abatement costs, and thus, they would emit more CO 2 emissions than their observed values and buy additional carbon emission permits to obtain more regionally industrial gross output value. 
Potential marginal abatement cost savings from trading
By using Model (12) and Eq. (13) described in section 4, the relative shadow prices of CO 2 emissions for each province are estimated. Table 3 presents the shadow prices of CO 2 and summarizes the situation of marginal abatement cost savings for each province. The O column represents the relative shadow prices calculated by the observed values. The NT column represents the relative shadow prices computed by the optimal values without trading carbon emission permit, that is, the marginal abatement cost for CO 2 after eliminating technical inefficiency. The T column represents the relative shadow prices computed by the optimal values with trading, that is, the marginal abatement cost for CO 2 after introducing an interspatial and intertemporal emission permit trading system. Moreover, the hook and cross indicate the situation that marginal abatement cost savings exist and not exist, respectively.
In Table 3 , the shadow prices of CO 2 among provinces shows significant difference, ranging from 0.15
Yuan/ton to 1285 Yuan/ton in the O scenario, from 0.03 Yuan/ton to 201 Yuan/ton in the NT scenario, and from 5 Yuan/ton to 65 Yuan/ton in the T scenario. There are two reasons for the gap on the shadow prices of CO 2 among provinces. One reason is the production heterogeneity on electricity generation among provinces.
For example, there are average 22% fossil fuel consumption in total energy consumption for electricity generation in Yunnan and Qinghai during 2011-2015, whereas there are over 99% fossil fuel consumption in total energy consumption for electricity generation in Tianjin and Shanghai. The difference in the energy structure for electricity generation will directly lead to the difference in CO 2 emissions. Another reason is that these shadow prices are derived from different simulation scenarios with differentiated simulation assumptions. Furthermore, the average shadow price of CO 2 emissions calculated by the observed values is the highest associated with both two directions and followed by the average shadow price of CO 2 emissions without trading and with trading. Therefore, it could be concluded that although not all provinces could be identified marginal abatement cost savings after removing technical inefficiency or introducing carbon emission permit trading system, the marginal abatement cost savings would occur at the national level. In specific, there are almost 47 and 39 yuan/ton marginal abatement cost savings under direction (1,0) and (1,1), respectively. The main findings from our research are summarized as follows:
i. There would be approximately 42% and 13% potential opportunity abatement cost savings from removing technical inefficiency and cross-industrial trading regulatory rigidity. Specifically, 2,305-billion-yuan annual average loss of gross output value would be recovered when technical inefficiency is eliminated, and 1,024-billion-yuan annual average loss of gross output value due to sub-optimal allocation of CO 2 emissions among provinces would be identified during 2011-2015. ii. Xinjiang and Henan, which could realize almost 350 billion yuan in economic gross output value loss with trading CO 2 emission permit, show the largest potential opportunity abatement cost savings. In addition, Qinghai, which could achieve over 100% economic gross output value recovery, shows the highest percentage increase in opportunity abatement cost savings.
iii. In the interspatial and intertemporal trading simulation, the CO 2 emission permit would be mainly transferred from east area to west area and from north area to south area in China's electricity generation industry.
iv. The relative shadow prices of CO 2 emissions ranges from 0.15 yuan to 1,285 Yuan per ton of CO 2 in the observed value scenario, from 0.03 yuan to 201 yuan per ton of CO 2 in the non-trading simulation scenario, and from 5 yuan to 65 yuan in the trading simulation scenario. Although the marginal abatement cost savings would not exist in all provinces, it would be identified through not only removing technical inefficiency but also introducing carbon emission permit trading system at the national level. Based on the results and conclusions, several important policy implications could be drawn as follows:
i. CO 2 emission permit trading system should be encouraged in China's power industry sector. As shown in Section 6, our results provide strong evidence that there would be a certain potential opportunity abatement cost savings and potential marginal abatement cost savings in the nationwide carbon emission permit trading scheme of China's power industry. Therefore, further improving the permit trading schemes in China's power industry sector may help realize these abatement cost savings and emission reduction potentials.
ii. CO 2 emission permit trading system should be also encouraged in other industry sectors of China. Except for power industry sector, there are other industry sectors with high energy consumption and high carbon emissions such as Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals industry sector. Hence, the nationwide CO 2 emission permit trading system will be helpful for saving abatement cost and controlling carbon emissions.
iii. While allocating CO 2 emission permit, one suggestion to the policy-makers is that not only the potential CO 2 emission reduction should be considered, but also the economic growth (or the potential of industrial value added) should be involved in.
iv. The policies on eliminating technical inefficiency should be improved in China's power industry sector.
v. Our results show that the marginal abatement cost of CO 2 shows significantly different among provinces, and thus, the initial allocation and initial price of carbon emission permit might be various among different provinces.
With the establishment of the nationwide carbon emission permit trading system, more and more industry sectors would be covered. Thus, future research would take into consideration of more industry sectors when understanding the impact of national carbon emission permit trading scheme on economic growth and social development.
